Pare che negli ultimi mesi ci siano stati degli attacchi di droni sul cosmodromo di Plesetsk, da dove lancia la costellazione tipo-Starlink Rassvet, e satelliti militari, fra le altre cose.
Da allora i NOTAM per i lanci da quel cosmodromo hanno iniziato a diventare più fumosi, con interdizioni più ampie in termini di tempo, lunghe anche 10 giorni, lanci che non avvengono all’apertura delle finestre comunicate, ma magari dopo 4 o 6 giorni e con orari di inizio e fine diversi per navi e aerei, ma che si sovrappongono in determinati lassi di tempo. Questo per non far capire esattamente quando parte un razzo.
Alcuni NOTAM contengono anche un mix di coordinate per le zone di impatto dei booster, che fanno presuppore doppi lanci nel giro di poco tempo e all’interno della stessa finestra NOTAM.
C’è anche la foto di resti di un drone. Potrebbe anche essere una buona scusa per rendere nebbiosi i lanci da lì.
Non è chiara l’entità dei danni ma la notizia è confermata e mi pare rilevante.
The Dubna Satellite Communications Center is considered Russia’s largest satellite teleport—a major ground hub that connects satellites with terrestrial communication networks. It is a key branch of the Russian Satellite Communications Company and plays an important role in managing satellite links across Russia and abroad.
Aggiornamento 24.06.
Additional data analysis confirmed the hit on the hardware and modular complex of 32-meter MARK-IV antenna, used for satellite communications, as well as on the technical building next to this antenna. Hit on Main Production and Administrative (hardware and software) building with partial destruction of one of the walls.
Un articolo della BBC sugli attacchi alle infrastrutture “spaziali” russe da parte dell’Ucraina. L’articolo è in russo, tradotto via google.
Over the past 10 days, Ukraine has launched several drone strikes against Russian space communications facilities. A total of five strikes hit four ground-based satellite communications complexes, two of which belonged to the Ministry of Defense and the other two to the Russian Satellite Communications Company. The BBC Russian Service has summarized the information on these attacks and attempted to understand the scale of the damage and the possible consequences of these strikes.
Uno studio degli effetti sull’economia locale degli attacchi ucraini contro gli impianti di raffinazione in Russia effettuato utilizzando i dati sulla luminosità notturna raccolti da tre satelliti della NASA (cfr. NASA Black Marble¹).
We study the local economic effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian oil
refineries, combining a manually verified event-level record of refinery strikes with quality-
screened daily satellite radiance from NASA Black Marble. The analysis covers 29 large
Russian refineries, 22 of which sustain verified direct hits over June 2022–May 2026. Using
a monthly staggered difference-in-differences design that compares refineries after their
first verified strike with not-yet-struck and never-struck refineries, we find that nighttime
radiance falls immediately and persistently after a refinery enters the strike campaign:
by roughly 30 percent in the innermost measured ring around the facility and by 15–18
percent within five kilometers, with the effect attenuating until it becomes small at twenty-
five kilometers. The innermost ring shows no recovery within the first post-strike year.
[1]
The Black Marble products (VNP46, VJ146, and VJ246) provide a long-term record of global nighttime light composites at daily, monthly, and yearly temporal resolutions. These science-quality products are provided in near real-time (NRT), within a three-hour window, and enable insights on human activity patterns such as light pollution, illegal fishing, and the flaring of waste natural gas, as well as the provision of assessments within conflict areas and for national security.
Secondo me se gli Ucraini continuano con questa intensità di attacco a breve i Russi avranno forti difficoltà nel mantenere i programmi dei lanci spaziali.
la mia non vuole essere una risposta di stampo politico, né tantomeno dichiarazione di posizione (al limite una provocazione suvvia), né una risposta che sottenda simpatie in questo teatro di guerra ma di base c’è che la russia non sa come si combatte una guerra.
e ho detto tutto. Non sapendo come si fa una guerra, ci sta che arrivi anche a sospendere il proprio programma spaziale date le gravissime conseguenze alle quali è andata incontro.
Oltretutto Putin, oltre che non sapere come si combattono le guerre non sa neanche come si rende di nuovo grande un programma spaziale, evidentemente tutto questo amore e rimpianto per l’Urss (la cosiddetta età dell’oro, per chi come lui la rimpiange) era una grande bufala, bufala che però dopo 26 anni inizia a non reggere più molto bene. Poveri cittadini russi e ucraini.
L’Ucraina vorrebbe dotarsi di una propria costellazione di satelliti.
Gli articoli da United 24 e Kyiv Post.
Ukrainian satellite communications company Stetman is proceeding with a $1.1 billion plan to deploy a nationally controlled 360-satellite network by 2030 to reduce reliance on foreign-operated services such as Starlink. Working through a joint venture named UASAT with Danish manufacturer GomSpace, the constellation is designed to serve state and military users and withstand electronic warfare. The first 120 satellites are slated for a 2027 launch with SpaceX. […]
Operating in low Earth orbit at an altitude of 550 kilometers, the constellation will initially serve state and military users, with access for Ukraine’s allies planned at a later stage. Stetman aims to launch the first 120 satellites with SpaceX in 2027, with full deployment of the 360 satellites expected by 2030. No formal arrangements have been announced for the launch of the remaining 240 satellites.
Mi chiedo se e come procederà SpaceX nel lanciare dei satelliti così direttamente concorrenti. Ci saranno poi degli accordi non pubblici col governo USA? o delle pressioni? del resto si entra nell’ambito della sicurezza nazionale.
GomSpace produce principalmente CubeSat, come è possibile che possa costruire satelliti in grado di sostituire Starlink?
Del resto l’UE non dispone di una rete satellitare propria in qualche modo paragonabile a Starlink.
Sembrerebbe che l’idea sia stata formulata durante l’ultime vertice UE. Vedremo se il Governo Ucraino poi preferirà chiedere alla UE una colletta per affittare servizi da aziende USA.
Incendio con esplosione presso lo stabilimento KNDS Ammo Italy S.p.A a Colleferro (RM), stessa via di AVIO, qualcuno pensa alla pista russa, qualcuno la esclude.
Non ci sono conferme ufficiali né stime su eventuali danni ma sono stati pubblicati video e immagini di droni che volano verso Plesetsk.
Un articolo da ua.news.
According to the Supernova+ monitoring Telegram channel, preliminary reports indicate that the Plesetsk Cosmodrome was targeted.
In the morning, a UAV alert was issued in the Arkhangelsk region of the Russian Federation. Governor Oleksandr Tsybulsky urged residents to take cover and warned that mobile internet service would be shut down. He did not report on the consequences of the attack.
The day before, drones were first spotted over Pinezh. District Head Lyudmila Kolik stated that “strategic targets” were the objective of the attack. In total, 40 UAVs were destroyed over the region. No casualties were reported. Prior to this, authorities had warned of the threat of drone attacks on August 12 and August 1.
Sembra che il tentativo dei russi di dotarsi di una costellazione alternativa a Starlink non stia andando per il meglio. I 16 satelliti lanciati a luglio non sarebbero riusciti a raggiungere l’orbita prevista e alcuni starebbero già per rientrare in atmosfera.
Un articolo da Defence Blog.
The U.S. Space Force catalogued 17 objects, the 16 satellites plus the rocket’s upper stage, on July 24 in an orbit averaging 289 by 327 km with an inclination of 82.3 degrees, RussianSpaceWeb reported, citing Space Force tracking data. Nine of the 16 satellites began orbit-raising maneuvers between late July and early August, but their resulting altitudes ranged from 313 to 332 km, roughly 200 km lower than where the first Rassvet batch stood at a comparable point after its own March 23 launch.
By August 5, 11 satellites in the second group were climbing, according to the tracking data cited in the report. By the end of August, three of those had stopped climbing and begun a slow decay at altitudes between 310 and 330 km. None of the 16 satellites in the batch managed to climb above 360 km, the report said.
L’analisi di ISW.
None of the 16 Rassvet satellites from the second batch launched on July 19 have reached their anticipated altitude of 550 kilometers as of August 31, according to data from live satellite tracker N2YO. Many of these satellites ended up at altitudes between 300 and 400 kilometers, and some are experiencing orbital decay; and at least two satellites are reportedly heading for reentry into Earth’s atmosphere. These altitudes are well short of the intended 870-kilometer operational altitude for the Rassvet satellites. Satellites orbiting at lower altitudes have shorter operational lifespans due to increased atmospheric drag from upper layers of Earth’s atmosphere and greater fuel expenditure than satellites operating at higher altitudes. It is unclear how long the lower-altitude Rassvet satellites will remain in orbit, but they will likely not operate for as long as Russia projected. Only 12 of the original 16 Rassvet satellites launched on March 24 had entered their anticipated altitude, reportedly 550 kilometers, as of July 31 and remain at such altitudes as of August 31. These 12 satellites reportedly provided Russian forces with two windows of connectivity with ground terminals for up to an hour and a half per day over Ukraine.